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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 13. Risk and Reward in Defense Contracting 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: The Honorable Brian Miller, Inspector General, U.S. General Services 
Administration 
The Excessive Profits of Defense Contractors: Evidence and Determinants 
Chong Wang and Joseph San Miguel 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Fixed-Price Development Contracts: A Historical Perspective 
William Lucyshyn, Jacques S. Gansler, and Jiahaun Lu 
University of Maryland 
A Quantitative Risk Analysis of Deficient Contractor Business System 
William Fast, Naval Postgraduate School 
Brian Miller—The U.S. Senate confirmed Brian D. Miller as the Inspector General of the U.S. 
General Services Administration on July 22, 2005. 
As Inspector General, Miller leads more than 300 auditors, special agents, lawyers, and support 
staff in conducting nationwide audits and investigations. As a national leader in the fight against 
procurement fraud, Miller participates in the U.S. Attorney General’s Financial Fraud Enforcement 
Task Force and partners with federal, state, and local officials to share information to detect, 
investigate, and prevent procurement, Recovery Act, and grant fraud. Miller is a frequent speaker at 
conferences, task force meetings, and regional working groups, and he testifies regularly before 
Congress. 
Before becoming Inspector General, Miller worked for the U.S. Department of Justice for 15 
years, beginning in the Office of Policy Development. Attorney General Janet Reno appointed him as 
an assistant U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, where he concentrated on procurement, 
grant, and health care fraud cases. In 2001, he served as the senior counsel to the deputy attorney 
general and special counsel for health care fraud for the U.S. Department of Justice. In 2002, he 
returned to the U.S. Attorney’s Office to serve as counsel to the United States attorney, while 
continuing grand jury, trial, and appellate responsibilities as an assistant U.S. attorney. 
Miller strives to provide aggressive, strategic, and creative leadership by developing new ways to 
fight fraud. In 2010, he established the Government Infrastructure Protection Initiative within his Office 
of Investigations to protect the federal procurement process and supply chain from the dangers 
associated with counterfeit products. In this effort, he partnered with the National Intellectual Property 
Rights Coordination Center. In 2008, he created a forensic auditing unit and sponsored federal 
forums to promote forensic auditing as a tool to analyze databases and to detect fraud. In 2006, Miller 
was named vice chair of the National Procurement Fraud Task Force, a task force of the Department 
of Justice, law enforcement offices, and several inspectors general. As co-chair of the Legislation 
Committee, he played a key role in amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation to require 
contractors to report overpayments and crimes. He was also a principal author of a legislative and 
regulatory reform white paper, which resulted in legislation, regulation, and a national debate on 
issues related to procurement fraud. 
Miller has received notable recognition for his service as Inspector General. He was recognized 
by Ethisphere Magazine as the 12th “most influential person in business ethics” by a worldwide panel 
of experts. He was named among “Those Who Dared: 30 Officials Who Stood Up for Our Country,” a 
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special report of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, a national advocacy 
organization. Miller also received the Attorney General’s Award for Distinguished Service. 
Miller has a Juris Doctor from the University of Texas.
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Quantitative Risk Analysis of Deficient Contractor 
Business Systems 
William Fast—COL Fast, USA (Ret.), facilitates acquisition and program management courses at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. He also writes and speaks on various management topics and provides 
consultation services to defense acquisition programs. From 2006–2010 COL Fast taught program 
and financial management courses at the Defense Acquisition University. [wrfast@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
This research reviews quantitative risk models to determine how to best portray the risk to the 
government of deficient contractor business systems. One model, operational value at risk 
(VaR) is proposed as the model for use by a government contracting officer when justifying 
the withholding of contractor payments for a “significant deficiency” in the contractor’s earned 
value management (EVM) system (per DFARS 252.234.7005, effective August 16, 2011). 
Research Issue 
The director of the Earned Value Management Division of the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) asked for assistance in developing a method that 
administrative contracting officers (ACO) can use to assess risk associated with non-
compliant contractor business systems. A recent rule change in the Defense Supplement to 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFARS, 2011) permits an ACO to withhold up to 10% of 
contract payments for a “significant deficiency” in a contractor’s business system that 
creates risk to the government. The research issue is how to objectively and quantitatively 
portray that risk in a way that supports a monetary withhold decision and can withstand 
push-back (to include litigation) from the defense contractor.  
Background 
Patterned after the Truman Committee of the World War II era, the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan cited numerous deficiencies in business 
systems used by companies executing contracts in support of those wars (Commission on 
Wartime Contracting, 2009). As a result of the commission’s hearing before the Congress in 
August 2009, Senate Bill 3454 was introduced and ultimately found its way into the Ike 
Skelton National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2011, directing that 
the Secretary of Defense develop and initiate a program for the improvement 
of contractor business systems to ensure that such systems provide timely, 
reliable information for the management of Department of Defense programs 
by the contractor and by the Department. (NDAA for FY2011, § 893)  
The legislation was precise in defining a “contractor business system” and a 
“covered contract” but only loosely defined a “significant deficiency” (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Definition of Terms, Contractor Business Systems 





 accounting system 
 estimating system 
 purchasing System 
 earned value management system 
 material management and accounting system 
 property management system  
Covered 
Contractor 
A contractor that is subject to the cost accounting standards under section 26 
of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422)  
Covered 
Contract1 
 cost-reimbursement contract 
 incentive-type contract 
 time-and-materials contract 
 labor-hour contract 
Significant 
Deficiency 
“…shortcoming in the system that materially affects the ability of officials of the 
Department of Defense and the contractor to rely upon information produced 
by the system that is needed for management purposes.” 
Acting on the 2009 Interim Report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the 
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics), published a draft rule on contractor business systems in January 2010. This 
first attempt at a contracting rule tried to explain what constitutes an acceptable business 
system and the percent of payments that would be withheld for deficiencies in single or 
multiple business systems. In response, the Department received 370 comments from 25 
respondents (Brodsky, 2010). 
Another draft of the proposed rule was issued for comment in December 2010. This 
draft clarified how Department officials would determine when contractor business systems 
are deficient, and it lowered from 20% to 10% the amount of payments that the Department 
could withhold from contractors when deficiencies go uncorrected (Brodsky, 2010). 
Respondent comments to the December 2010 draft rule for contractor business systems 
ranged over 34 different topic areas. Some of the more significant objections to this draft 
rule were the following: 
 The rule fails to offer any guidance to the contracting officer for describing a 
“significant deficiency.” 
 There is the potential for inconsistent application of business system criteria 
when determining a “significant deficiency.” 
 The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Contract 
Audit Agency (DCAA) are under-resourced to implement the rule. 
By May 18, 2011, an interim rule, with comments from interested respondents, was 
published in the Federal Register (DFARS, 2011, Case 2009-D038, pp. 28856–28879). The 
interim rule took effect on contracts awarded on or after August 16, 2011.  
                                                
1 “The [interim] rule [dated May 18, 2011] has been tailored to comply with section 893 of the FY11 NDAA. DoD 
has interpreted the definition of ‘covered contract’ to include CAS-covered cost type contracts as well as CAS-
covered fixed-price contracts and performance-based contracts since section 893 also allows up to 10 percent of 
progress payments and performance-based payments to be withheld” (Federal Register, 2011, p. 28862). 
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In addition, the DCMA has developed an implementation procedure to guide its 
administrative contracting officers who will be enforcing the rule (Contractor Business 
Systems, Instruction Folder Number 301 to the DCMA [2012a] Guidebook). 
To date, only one contractor has had payments withheld under the new rule. Starting 
in March 2012, 2% of payments to Lockheed Martin Corporation’s aeronautics division were 
withheld due to deficiencies in its earned value management system (EVM system). The 
withholds total about $1million per month from billings on Lockheed’s latest production 
contract for 30 F-35 fighters. The total contract value is about $4 billion (Cappacio, 2012). If 
the EVM system deficiencies remain uncorrected through the entire period of performance 
of the contract, the total withhold could be about $80 million. 
The DCMA decertified Lockheed’s aeronautics division EVM system in October 
2010, about 10 months before the business systems rule went into effect. At that time, the 
DCMA had determined that 19 of 32 EVM system guidelines were not being followed (see 
Appendix A for the 32 EVM system guidelines). Owing to the fact that Lockheed has made 
corrections and improvements to its EVM system since that time, the Pentagon payment 
withholdings were set at 2% rather than the 5% maximum permitted by law for a significant 
deficiency in a single business system (Cappacio, 2012).  
Literature Review 
Galway (2004) presents a critical review of the use of quantitative risk analysis in 
system development projects like those managed by the Department of Defense. He 
concludes that quantitative risk analysis can be a valuable tool; however, it is not well 
understood by project managers, not well integrated into project management, and hard to 
explain to senior decision-makers. He found few empirical examples attesting to the 
usefulness of quantitative risk analysis in complex development projects (Galway, 2004, p. 
19). 
Qualitative Risk Analysis Prevails Within DoD 
Galway’s observations track with current Department of Defense acquisition policy 
and guidance. Quantitative assessment of risk consequences are mentioned only once in 
the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (USD[AT&L], 2006, p. 33). In the current 
version of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the phrase “quantitative risk analysis” is used 
only three times (all uses pertain to cost estimating), and there are no practical examples 
provided to explain the analysis method to the reader (DoD, 2012, pp. 138, 158). 
However, Galway (2004) does bring insight to the challenge of quantifying business 
system risks by suggesting that all risks should be mapped to cost, schedule, and 
performance by asking these questions: 1) How much will the project finally cost?; 2) How 
long will the project eventually take?; and 3) Will this product perform according to 
specifications? (Galway, 2004, p. ix). Moreover, his approach agrees with the cost, 
schedule, and performance categorization of risk found in the Risk Management Guide for 
DoD Acquisition (USD[AT&L], 2006, pp. 13–16). 
From Qualitative to Quantitative Risk Analysis Using Existing DoD Guidance 
Could the current Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition be revised to include 
more quantitative risk analysis? The answer is yes. During risk assessment, the guide 
requires the analysis of future root causes of risk as to probability of occurrence and severity 
or consequence if that future root cause is realized. Simply multiplying the probability of a 
risk event (expressed as a decimal) by a monetized severity of loss would yield a monetary 
risk number. Adding up all of those monetary risk numbers for all elements of an acquisition 
program would provide an informative, albeit somewhat simplified quantitative risk 
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assessment. There are more sophisticated approaches to quantifying risk that could be 
applied to risk due to deficient contractor business systems. These methods include 
expected value of information (EVI) decision theory and value at risk (VaR) methods, both of 
which consider probability distributions. 
Expected Value of Information (EVI) 
One government response to public comments related to the risk of harm and 
materiality of deficiencies in the December 2010 draft business systems rule was stated as 
follows: “In most cases, the financial impact of a system deficiency cannot be quantified 
because the system produces unreliable information” (Federal Register, 2011, p. 28859). 
Hubbard (2007) would challenge that statement. Hubbard maintains that understanding 
quantitative risk is the key to understanding how to value information (or, by implication, 
partial information or unreliable information).  
Using decision theory, Hubbard explains an approach for measuring the expected 
value of information (Hubbard, 2007, chapter 7). His basic equation is as follows: 
ܧܸܫ = ܧܱܮ	(ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁	݂݅݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊) − ܧܱܮ	(݂ܽݐ݁ݎ	݂݅݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊) (1) 
where, 
ܧܸܫ = ܧݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݋݂	ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊	
ܧܱܮ = ܧݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀	ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐݕ	ܮ݋ݏݏ = ܥℎܽ݊ܿ݁	݋݂	ܾ݁݅݊݃	ݓݎ݋݊݃	 × 	ܥ݋ݏݐ	݋݂	ܾ݁݅݊݃	ݓݎ݋݊݃  
(Hubbard, 2007, p. 88) 
Hubbard (2007) contends that EOL exists because of uncertainty that clouds the 
negative consequences of our decisions. By acquiring more information, uncertainty will be 
reduced and, in turn, the EOL will be reduced. Moreover, the Expected Value of Perfect 
Information (EVPI) can be determined when uncertainty is eliminated (Hubbard, 2007, pp. 
89–89). 
Hubbard (2007) contends that EOL exists because of uncertainty that clouds the 
negative consequences of our decisions. By acquiring more information, uncertainty will be 
reduced and, in turn, the EOL will be reduced. Moreover, the Expected Value of Perfect 
Information (EVPI) can be determined when uncertainty is eliminated (Hubbard, 2007, pp. 
89–89). 
This approach might be useful for the government contracting officer. EVPI might be 
calculated for each of the six contractor business system, assuming that the information 
provided is flawless so that the decisions made from that information are never wrong. The 
sum of each of the six business system EVPIs would represent the total dollar value to the 
government of a particular contractor’s business systems. 
Value at Risk (VaR) 
Jorion (2007) has written one of the most comprehensive texts on how banks and 
other financial institutions use value at risk (VaR) to quantify potential investment losses. He 
defines VaR as “the worst loss over a target horizon such that there is a low, prespecified 
probability that the actual loss will be larger” (Jorion, 2007, p. 106). Knowing the VaR with a 
high degree of confidence tells the firm how much cash and capital reserves are necessary 
to cover the risk. Mathematically, Jorion’s concept of VaR looks like this: 
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ܮ = ܮ݋ݏݏ,݉݁ܽݏݑݎ݁݀	ܽݏ	ܽ	݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁	݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	
ܸܴܽ = ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	ܽݐ	ܴ݅ݏ݇, ݎ݁݌݋ݎݐ݁݀	ܽݏ	ܽ	݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁	݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	
ܿ = ܿ݋݂݊݅݀݁݊ܿ݁	݈݁ݒ݈݁, ݁ݔ݌ݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀	ܽݏ	ܽ	݈݀݁ܿ݅݉ܽ	(݁. ݃. , .99) 
(Jorion, 2007, p.106) 
Jorion’s approach to quantifying downside risk has five steps: (1) Determine the 
current value of the portfolio (mark position to market); (2) Measure the variability of the 
various risk factors, such as changes in interest rates, fluctuations in foreign exchange 
rates, and volatility in commodity and equity prices; (3) Since volatility grows with the square 
root of time, set the time horizon, based on the trading days over which the assets will be 
held; (4) Select the desired confidence level; and (5) calculate the potential loss (Jorion, 
2007, p. 107). In its simplest form, VaR can be expressed as follows: 
ܸܴܽ = ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ	ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	($) × 	ߪ	 ×	ඥݐ/252 × ߙ  (3) 
where, 
ߪ = ݉݁ܽݏݑݎ݁݀	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݋݂	ݎ݅ݏ݇	݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ, ݁ݔ݌ݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀	ܽݏ	ܽ	݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	
ݐ = ݐݎܽ݀݅݊݃	݀ܽݕݏ; 252 = ݐݎܽ݀݅݊݃	݀ܽݕݏ	݅݊	ܽ	ݕ݁ܽݎ	
ߙ = ܿ݋݂݊݅݀݁݊ܿ݁	݈݁ݒ݈݁, ݁ݔ݌ݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀	ܽݏ	ܽ	݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ	(݁. ݃. , ܽݏݏݑ݉݅݊݃	99%	ܿ݋݂݊݅݀݁݊ܿ݁	
				ܽ݊݀	ܽ	݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ	݀݅ݏݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊, ݐℎ݁	݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ	ݓ݋ݑ݈݀	ܾ݁	2.33) 
From this basic VaR equation, Jorion (2007) presents three models for calculating 
VaR. The local-valuation method determines the value of a portfolio once and uses 
mathematical derivatives, both linear and quadratic, to measure exposures to the variability 
of risk (σ) (Jorion, pp. 249–251). The full-valuation method reprices a financial portfolio over 
a range of risk scenarios, using tools such as Monte Carlo simulation (Jorion, 2007, pp. 
251–257). And, the historical simulation method is a nonparametric approach that “replays” 
the tape of history on the current market value of a portfolio (Jorion, 2007, pp. 262–263). 
Hendricks (1996) has evaluated these three methods of calculating VaR using 
historical financial market data. He concludes that all of these methods cover the risks they 
are intended to cover and that the risk estimates do not differ much in average size. 
Substantial differences between the methods are seen when comparing methods for one 
trading date; however, less variation is seen over longer periods (Hendricks, 1996, pp.55–
56). Hendricks’ method of validating VaR methods using historical market data is also 
instructive for this research into the risk analysis of deficient business system. Unless the 
quantitative risk methods can be verified as covering the government’s risks and unless 
those methods can be used by the contracting officer, they are of little use.  
Kaufman and Sougstad (2007) use VaR in a slightly different manner. They use VaR 
as a constraint function to help make better decisions on risks associated within a portfolio 
of information technology (IT) service contracts. They consider the risk levels of various 
mixes of these IT contracts (high, medium, and low) and maximize an objective function for 
profitability, subject to the VaR constraint. This approach might be useful for the government 
contracting officer when selecting a portfolio of services contractors within a military 
contingency operation, while keeping the overall program within a predetermined VaR to the 
government. 
Operational Value at Risk (VaR) 
Jorion (2007) devotes an entire chapter to Operational Risk Management, an 
approach to quantifying risk using methods from the insurance industry and from VaR. In the 
financial sector, operational risk is rooted in fraud and poor governance. Realized 
operational risks come in two varieties. High-frequency/low-value risks occur mainly from 
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daily transaction errors and poorly implemented internal controls that do not catch these 
errors. Data on these relatively small but frequent losses is easy to collect, provided that the 
losses are reported. On the other hand, low-frequency/high-value risks are the big losses 
that ultimately bankrupt an institution. Examples include the corporate lies that resulted in 
the Enron scandal in 2001 and the more recent subprime mortgage crisis that led to the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. When combined, the continuous distribution of the 
severities of both of these types of risk losses decreases exponentially with the size of the 
loss. The log-normal, Weibull, and gamma probability distributions are often used to model 
this type of loss distribution (Jorion, 2007, pp. 501, 511). The gamma distribution is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Gamma Distribution 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012) 
Jorion (2007, p. 497) measures operational risk using a 4-step approach: (1) Define 
risk categories such as processes, people, systems, and external events; (2) Measure risk 
factors in terms of loss frequency; (3) Measure exposure in terms of loss severity; and (4) 
Calculate risk, either operational VaR or expected loss. The probability distribution function 
of loss, used in the calculation of either operational VaR or expected loss, is determined 
using this integral: 
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݊ = ݈݋ݏݏ	݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ	(݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݋ܿܿݑݎ݁݊ܿ݁ݏ	݋݂	݈݋ݏݏ	݋ݒ݁ݎ	ݐℎ݁	ݐ݅݉݁	ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊)	
݂(݊) = 	݌ݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݀݅ݏݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊	݂ݑ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊	݋݂	ݐℎ݁	݈݋ݏݏ	݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ	(݊) 
From Equation 4, we see that the probability distribution function of the aggregated 
loss is a combination of the loss frequency and the loss severity probability distributions. 
Combining the frequency and severity distributions can either be done manually by 
systematically tabulating all possible combinations (the process is termed convolution) or by 
the integral, as shown in Equation 4 (Jorion, 2007, pp. 498–501). 
 
Research Methodology 
This initial research effort addressed only EVM systems, one of the six contractor 
business systems identified in section 893 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011. Data was extracted from contract performance reports (CPR) in the 
Defense Cost and Resource Center (DCARC) EVM Central Repository. The repository 
provides and supports the centralized reporting, collection, and distribution for key 
acquisition EVM data, such as CPRs, Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR), and the 
Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) for Acquisition Category 1C & 1D (Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs) as well as ACAT 1A (Major Automated Information System) 
programs.  
When monthly CPRs are submitted by the defense contractor, government analysts 
must check to ensure that the data makes sense. If errors are present and remain 
undetected, the data could result in poor decisions by both the contractor and the 
government. This is called a validity check of the CPR data and the check ties most directly 
to the accounting related group of EVM system guidelines (16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21; a 
description of the EVM system guidelines is at Appendix A). 
The DCARC provides, free of charge to both government and contractor EVMS 
analysts, CPR file viewer software that includes a tool designed to perform validity checks 
on the EVM data contained in the CPR. There are a total of 10 validity checks included in 
the software. These validity checks have been endorsed by the Government Accountability 
Office Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (GAO-09-3SP; GAO, 2009) and the Society 
of Cost Estimating and Analysis Cost Estimating Body of Knowledge (SCEA CEBoK). 
Two of the validity checks that provide a definitive measure of data validity are as 
follows: (1) the cumulative Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) has value with no 
corresponding cumulative Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP); and (2) cumulative 
ACWP has value with no corresponding cumulative BCWP. The first validity check indicates 
that budgeted and authorized work performed in a particular Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) element was recorded in the EVM system, but no labor or material costs were 
recorded in the company’s accounting system for that work. The effect of this error is to 
understate the actual cost of work that has been performed. The second validity check 
reveals that actual labor and material costs (ACWP) were recorded against a particular WBS 
in the accounting system, but no earned value (BCWP) was credited in the EVM system of 
the company. The effect of this error is to overstate the actual cost of work that has been 
performed. 
Three system development efforts, from three different defense contractors, were 
selected from the DCARC EVM Central Repository. For each of these systems, three 
separate monthly CPRs were selected. The two validity checks discussed in this section 
were performed on each of these nine CPRs. 
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Results Analysis and Conclusion 
Loss distributions were analyzed using Risk Solver Platform by Frontline Systems. In 
most cases, the loss distributions were best fit by the gamma distribution. Thus, Jorion’s 
(2007) operational VaR method could be used to estimate the risk to the government of 
deficient information from contractor EVM systems. 
Use of the VaR model would benefit the government contracting officer by providing 
a defensible risk value as the basis for withholding contractor payments. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Future research should define a “significant deficiency” in an EVM system and what 
it means for that significant deficiency to materially affect the ability to rely upon information 
produced by the EVM system.  
Future research should map significant deficiencies to risk of harm to the 
government (future root causes of risk with probability and consequence). Risk of harm may 
be outside the contract (e.g., new replacement aircraft carrier will be delivered late, requiring 
old aircraft carrier to be retained in service with added operating and maintenance costs). 
Risk of harm may include the value of not having a needed combat capability (i.e., liquidated 
damages). Moreover, risk of harm may include such things as supply chain and industrial 
base risks. In addition, future research should take a look at current EVM system metrics 
that are already collected on a regular basis and focus on the impact (if any) those metrics 
have on risk of harm.  
Future research should include validation of the operational VaR model and the 
simplification of that model into a template that can be used by contracting officers. 
Research should also be conducted into changes needed to the DCMA contractor business 
systems instruction, EVM system compliance review instruction, and EVM system standard 
surveillance instruction as a result of using operational VaR. 
Once the operational VaR method is devised for significant materials deficiencies in 
EMV systems, apply operational VaR (or another more suitable quantitative method) to the 
other five business systems covered by DFARS (2011) 252.234.7005, being careful to first 
define significant deficiency, materially affect, and risks of harm for each of those business 
systems, separately. 
Additional research proposed by the DCMA is found at Appendix B. 
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Appendix A. ANSI/EIA-748 Earned Value Management System (EVMS) 
Guidelines (Fleming & Koppelmann, 2005, pp. 191–214) 
ANSI/EIA-748 GUIDELINES 
ORGANIZATION 
Criterion 1. Define the authorized work elements for the agency. A WBS, tailored for 
effective internal management control, is commonly used in this process. 
Criterion 2. Identify the organizational structure including the major contractors responsible 
for accomplishing the authorized work, and define the organizational elements in which work 
will be planned and controlled. 
Criterion 3. Provide for the integration of the agency’s planning, scheduling, budgeting, work 
authorization and cost accumulation processes with each other, the WBS, and the OBS. 
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Criterion 4. Identify the organization or function responsible for controlling overhead (indirect 
costs).  
Criterion 5. Provide for integration of the WBS and the organizational structure in a manner 
that permits cost and schedule performance measurement by elements of either or both 
structures as needed.  
PLANNING, SCHEDULING, AND BUDGETING 
Criterion 6. Schedule the authorized work in a manner that describes the sequence of work 
and identifies significant task interdependencies required to meet the requirements of the 
program. 
Criterion 7. Identify physical products, milestones, technical performance goals, or other 
indicators that will be used to measure progress.  
Criterion 8. Establish and maintain a time-phased budget baseline, at the control account 
level, against which performance can be measured. Budget for far-term efforts may be held 
in higher-level accounts until an appropriate time for allocation at the control account level. 
Initial budgets established for performance measurement will be based on either internal 
management goals or the external customer-negotiated target cost including estimates for 
authorized but undefined work. 
Criterion 9. Establish budgets for authorized work with identification of significant cost 
elements (labor, material, etc.) as needed for internal management and for control of 
contractors.  
Criterion 10. To the extent it is practical to identify the authorized work in discrete work 
packages, establish budgets for this work in terms of dollars, hours, or other measurable 
units. Where the entire control account is not subdivided into work packages, identify the far 
term effort in larger planning packages for budget and scheduling purposes.  
Criterion 11. Provide that the sum of all work package budgets plus planning package 
budgets within a control account equals the control account budget.  
Criterion 12. Identify and control level of effort activity by time-phased budgets established 
for this purpose. Only that effort which is immeasurable or for which measurement is 
impractical may be classified as level of effort.  
Criterion 13. Establish overhead budgets for each significant organizational component of 
the company for expenses that will become indirect costs. Reflect in the budgets, at the 
appropriate level, the amounts in overhead pools that are planned to be allocated as indirect 
costs.  
Criterion 14. Identify management reserves and undistributed budget. 
Criterion 15. Provide that the allocated budget is reconciled with the sum of all internal 
budgets and management reserves.  
ACCOUNTING 
Criterion 16. Record direct costs in a manner consistent with the budgets in a formal system 
controlled by the general books of account. 
Criterion 17. Summarize direct costs from control accounts into the WBS without allocation 
of a single control account to two or more WBS elements.  
Criterion 18. Summarize direct costs from the control accounts into the agency’s 
organizational elements without allocation of a single control account to two or more 
organizational elements.  
Criterion 19. Record all indirect costs that will be allocated to the agency.  
Criterion 20. Identify unit costs, equivalent units costs, or lot costs when needed. 
Criterion 21. For EVMS, the material accounting system will provide for: 
 Accurate cost accumulation and assignment of costs to control accounts in a manner 
consistent with the budgets using recognized, acceptable, costing techniques. 
 Cost performance measurement at the point in time most suitable for the category of 
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material involved, but no earlier than the time of progress payments or actual receipt 
of material. 
 Full accountability of all material purchased including the residual inventory. 
MANAGERIAL ANALYSIS & REPORTING  
Criterion 22. At least on a monthly basis, generate the following information at the control 
account and other levels as necessary for management control using actual cost data from, 
or reconcilable with, the accounting system: 
 Comparison of the amount of planned budget and the amount of budget earned for 
work accomplished. This comparison provides the schedule variance. 
 Comparison of the amount of the budget earned with the actual (applied where 
appropriate) direct costs for the same work. This comparison provides the cost 
variance. 
Criterion 23. Identify, at least monthly, the EV Variance between both planned and actual 
schedule performance and planned and actual cost performance, and provide the reasons 
for the variances in the detail needed by management.  
Criterion 24. Identify budgeted and applied (or actual) indirect costs at the level and 
frequency needed by management for effective control, along with the reasons for any 
significant variances.  
Criterion 25. Summarize the data elements and associated variances through the 
organization and/or WBS to support management needs and any customer reporting 
specified in the contract. 
Criterion 26. Implement managerial actions taken as the result of earned value information. 
Criterion 27. Develop revised EAC based on performance to date, commitment values for 
material, and estimates of future conditions. Compare this information with the performance 
measurement baseline to identify variances at completion important to company 
management and any applicable customer reporting requirements including statements of 
funding requirements.  
BASELINE MANAGEMENT 
Criterion 28. Incorporate authorized changes in a timely manner, recording the effects of 
such changes in budgets and schedules. In the directed effort prior to negotiation of a 
change, base such revisions on the amount estimated and budgeted to the organizations.  
Criterion 29. Reconcile current budgets to prior budgets in terms of changes to the 
authorized work and internal replanning in the detail needed by management for effective 
control. 
Criterion 30. Control retroactive changes to records pertaining to work performed that would 
change previously reported amounts for actual costs, earned value, or budgets. Adjustments 
should be made only for correction of errors, routine accounting adjustments, effects of 
customer or management directed changes, or to improve the baseline integrity and 
accuracy of performance measurement data.  
Criterion 31. Prevent revisions to the agency budget except for authorized changes.  
Criterion 32. Document changes to the performance measurement baseline.  
Appendix B. Proposed Research on Significant Material Deficiency, Prepared 
by DCMA, March 28, 2012 
QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR ESTIMATING SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL 
DEFICIENCY 
References: 
(a) DFARS: Business systems, Interim rule, Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 96, 18 
May 2011. 
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(b) National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011, sect. 893, Contractor Business 
Systems. 
(c) ANSI/EIA 748C EVMS Guidelines  
(d) DCMA EVMS Compliance Review Instruction 
(e) DCMA Contractor Business Systems Instruction 
1. BACKGROUND—Statutory and regulatory guidance in references (a) and (b) identify six 
(6) contractor business systems that may, when providing inaccurate and unreliable data, 
create a “risk of harm” to the government. When that risk is substantiated and validated by 
the discovery of significant deficiencies in the contractor’s business system, reference (a) 
authorizes the government to withhold payment to the contractor to mitigate the risk. In 
many cases, the financial impact and materiality of the deficiency is difficult to quantify, since 
it is the inaccurate and unreliable data produced by the business system that is (in fact) the 
deficiency. Although six business systems are covered by references (a) and (b), the initial 
focus on this research is the earned value management system (EVMS). Methods, 
practices, and guidelines for establishing EVMS deficiencies are fairly mature. Reference (c) 
guidelines are explicitly cited as “high risk” guidelines (GL: 
1,3,6,7,8,9,10,12,16,21,23,26,27,28,30,32). A significant deficiency in any one of these 
guidelines constitutes EVMS non-compliance. In any case, the standard for withholding 
payments to the contractor is commensurate with the ($) risk to the government. It is the 
causal relationship between risk and system deficiency and the calculation of a risk value (in 
$dollars) that is the core issue. A consistent, repeatable and quantitative method is needed 
to fairly determine if payment withholds of 5% are necessary to mitigate the government’s 
risk. 
2. RESEARCH TOPICS/QUESTIONS—The following research topics are suggested: 
a. Similar risk management problems exist in industry, including insurance, banking, 
and investment portfolio management. In the insurance industry, actuarial data is applied to 
model risk and risk capital reserves are “held” to cover the expected values for claims. In 
banking, the banks hold cash reserves to maintain liquidity and cover the expected values of 
depositor withdrawals, based on regulatory requirements for capital (risk) reserves. In 
investment portfolios, managers evaluate value at risk across the portfolio and adjust 
holdings as necessary to maintain the risk value below acceptable levels. In all three of 
these examples, the scenario manages risk in an environment that is characterized by 
probabilistic behavior, expected ($) values and risk management objectives that are 
governed by regulation and statutory law. Research questions are as follows: 
i. Can any of these risk management models (or others) be extrapolated to the 
business system rule implementation? 
ii. What quantitative methods can be developed to quantify material financial 
risk to government when a business system produces “unreliable and 
inaccurate data”? 
iii. How do other regulatory activities manage risk that is caused by business 
system deficiencies? 
b. EVMS are “critical guidelines” (cited above). When a significant deficiency exists in 
one of these guidelines the EVMS is non-compliant and will be disapproved by the 
administrative contracting officer (ACO). A significant deficiency in a non-high risk guideline 
may result in disapproval at the discretion of the ACO. The following research questions, 
specific to EVMS apply: 
i. Is there any rank or natural order to the potential severity of the deficiency 
posed by these guidelines? To what degree is there inter-dependence or 
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causality across these guidelines? Can they be group or “binned” WRT 
causality of risk? 
ii. What quantitative method(s) can be used to calculate risk value WRT non-
compliance of critical guidelines, or non-critical guidelines? 
iii. What quantitative definition of “significant deficiency” is applicable? 
iv. Is it possible to develop a deterministic rule set that yields a consistent and 
repeatable finding of significant deficiency? 
v. What should be the relationship of risk value calculations and findings of 
EVMS (GL) non-compliance with 
a. Probability of error, 
b. Magnitude of errors, and 
c. Adverse impact of errors 
c. Other business systems are also within the scope of references (a) and (b); the 
following questions apply: 
i. Can an extensible method be developed for all business systems WRT the 
calculation of risk value? 
ii. What is the standard of compliance that applies to the non-EVMS business 
systems? Do these standards have clearly defined “compliance” criteria? 
d. Instead of “measuring” business system compliance with various guidelines and 
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 1 
Research Issue 
• Request from Director of the Earned Value Management Division of the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
 
• Asked for assistance in developing a method that Administrative Contracting 
Officers (ACO) can use to assess risk associated with non-compliant 
contractor business systems 
 
• A recent rule change in the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (DFARS) permits an ACO to withhold up to 10% of contract 
payments for a “significant deficiency” in a contractor’s business system that 
creates risk to the government. 
 
• The research issue is how to objectively and quantitatively portray that risk in 
a way that supports a monetary withhold decision and can withstand push-
back (to include litigation) from the defense contractor.  
 
2 
Definition of Terms 
Contractor Business Systems 





 accounting system 
 estimating system 
 purchasing system 
 earned value management system 
 material management and accounting system 
 property management system  
Covered 
Contractor 
A contractor that is subject to the cost accounting standards under section 26 of 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422)  
Covered 
Contract 
 cost-reimbursement contract 
 incentive-type contract 
 time-and-materials contract 
 labor-hour contract 
Significant 
Deficiency 
“…shortcoming in the system that materially affects the ability of officials of the 
Department of Defense and the contractor to rely upon information produced by 
the system that is needed for management purposes.” 
 
3 
Feedback on December 2010 Draft Rule 
• The rule fails to offer any guidance to the contracting 
officer for describing a “significant deficiency.” 
 
• There is the potential for inconsistent application of 
business system criteria when determining a 
“significant deficiency.” 
 
• The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) are 
under-resourced to implement the rule. 
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*Notional, see Jorion (2007), Value at Risk, Chapter 19, Operational Risk 
5 
Earned Value Management 
32 Guidelines  
1. Define the Project Work Scope 
2. Define the Project Organization 
3. Integrate Subsidiary Processes 
4. Identify Overhead Management 
5. Integrate WBS/OBS to Create Control 
Accounts 
6. Schedule with network logic 
7. Set measurement indicators 
8. Establish the CBB/PMB 
9. Budget by cost elements 
10. Create work/planning packages 
11. Sum WP/PP budgets to the Control 
Account 
12. Level of Effort planning 
13. Set overhead budgets 
14. Identify Management Reserve and 
Undistributed Budget 
15. Reconcile CBB to target values 
 
16. Record direct costs 
17. Summarize direct costs by WBS elements 
18. Summarize direct costs by OBS elements 
19. Record/allocate indirect costs 
20. Identify unit and lot costs as needed 
21. Track and report material costs/quantities 
22. Calculate Schedule Variance & Cost 
Variance 
23. Identify significant variances for analysis 
24. Analyze indirect Cost Variance  
25. Summarize information for management 
26. Implement corrective actions 
27. Revise Estimate At Completion 
28. Incorporate changes in a timely manner 
29. Reconcile current to prior budgets 
30. Control retroactive changes 
31. Prevent unauthorized revisions 
32. Document PMB changes 
 
Source:  Defense Acquisition University, BCF-262 Card EVMS Guidelines 
Accounting Processes 
6 
Contract Performance Report 
Validity Checks 
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide* 
Definitive 
Measure? 
Source:  CPR File Viewer Users Guide, Version 1.0.2.20, p. 30 
*Similar definitive sanity checks are found in the SCEA CEBoK, p. 57 
7 
Two Validity Checks Selected 
BCWP with no ACWP 
• Indicates that budgeted and 
authorized work performed in 
a particular Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) element was 
recorded in EVM system, but 
no labor or material costs 
were recorded in company’s 
accounting system for that 
work.  
 
• The effect of this error is to 
understate the actual cost of 
work that has been 
performed. 
ACWP with no BCWP 
• Reveals that actual labor and 
material costs (ACWP) were 
recorded against a particular 
WBS in the accounting system, 
but no earned value (BCWP) 
was credited in the EVM 
system of the company. 
 
• The effect of this error is to 
overstate the actual cost of 



























1 Feb-12 6 47443 0.01 13 2359780 0.02 719 
1 Nov-11 7 80043 0.01 10 25000 0.01 719 
1 Aug-11 9 114269 0.01 10 33269 0.01 716 
2 Feb-12 30 175295 0.01 324 5722147 0.15 2216 
2 Dec-11 40 272495 0.02 242 6004275 0.12 2012 
2 Aug-11 24 445108 0.01 217 15931175 0.13 1635 
3 Jan-12 82 1228323 0.10 30 58140 0.04 820 
3 Oct-11 84 1363864 0.11 22 90663 0.03 779 
3 Jul-11 49 1086391 0.07 11 35545 0.02 710 
9 
Research Results 










• Distributions were best fit by Exponential (2), Gamma 
(4), Weibull (5), and LogLogistics (6) loss distributions.   
 
• An Operational Value at Risk (VaR) method (Jorion, 2007) 
could be used to estimate the risk to the government of 
deficient information from contractor EVM systems. 
 
• Use of the VaR model would benefit the government 
contracting officer by providing a more defensible risk 




Research Topic 1 
 
Similar risk management problems exist in industry, including:  insurance, banking, 
and investment portfolio management.  In the insurance industry, actuarial data is 
applied to model risk and risk capital reserves are maintained to cover the 
expected values for claims.  Banks hold cash reserves to maintain liquidity and 
cover the expected values of depositor withdrawals, based on regulatory 
requirements for capital (risk) reserves.  Investment portfolio managers evaluate 
value at risk across the portfolio and adjust holdings as necessary to maintain the 
risk value below acceptable levels.  In all three of these examples the risk 
environment is characterized by probabilistic behavior, expected dollar values, and 
risk management objectives that are governed by regulation and statutory law.   
 
• Can any of these risk management models (or others) be extrapolated to the 
business system rule implementation?   
• What quantitative methods can be developed to quantify material financial risk to 
government when a business system produces “unreliable and inaccurate data”?   





Research Topic 2   
 
Under ANSI/EIA-748, Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) must comply 
with 32 guidelines.   When a significant deficiency exists in one of the critical 
guidelines the EVMS is non-compliant and will be disapproved by the 
Administrative Contracting Officer. The following research questions apply 
specifically to EVMS: 
 
• Is there any rank or natural order to the potential severity of the deficiency posed 
by these guidelines?  To what degree is there inter-dependence or causality across 
these guidelines?  Can they be group with respect to causality of risk? 
• What quantitative method(s) can be used to calculate risk value with respect to 
non-compliance of critical guidelines, or non-critical guidelines? 
• What quantitative definition of “significant deficiency” is applicable? 
• Is it possible to develop a deterministic a rule set that yields a consistent and 
repeatable finding of significant deficiency? 
• What should be the relationship of risk value calculations and findings of EVMS 
non-compliance, with:  1) probability of error; 2) magnitude of errors; and, 3) 




Research Topic 3 
 
Other business systems (accounting, estimating, material management and 
accounting, purchasing, and property management) are also within the scope of 
the contractor business system rule and the following questions apply: 
 
• What is the standard of compliance that applies to the non-EVMS business 
systems?  Do these standards have clearly defined compliance criteria? 
• Can an extensible method be developed for all business systems with respect to 
the calculation of risk value? 
 
 
Research Topic 4 
 
      Instead of measuring business system compliance with various guidelines and 
standards, is there a better approach to risk management, when there is potential 
harm to the government?  
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